Modelling the effects of BLEVE blast on a building spanning an underpass

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Abstract: The use of space is being intensified near and above transport routes of hazardous materials. In The Netherlands, some buildings are even realized above infrastructure with transport of hazardous materials like LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas). An accident with an LPG-tank may result in a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion), causing injuries and large structural damage to the spanning building and the vicinity. Fortunately, such disasters are scarce up to now. However, one should be aware of that such accidents may occur and escalation from accident to disaster should be prevented. This paper presents an analysis of structural measures to control the consequences for the spanning building when the explosion occurs in the underpass. There is little background literature that addressed the same problem, i.e. structural control of explosion effects for buildings above infrastructure with transport of LPG. In this paper explosion effects were modelled and the dynamic response of the structural elements and the main bearing structure of the building were analyzed using engineering techniques. Recommendations to limit and control damage are given, in which safety measures could be integrated in structural and functional building design.

Keywords: Explosion effects, BLEVE, transport of hazardous materials, multiple use of space, structural dynamics.

1. INTRODUCTION

As a consequence of an ever-growing population, land is becoming scarcer, especially in urban areas. This has led to the development of design and construction techniques that make intensive and multiple use of the limited space possible. In the last decade, the space available above transport infrastructure - such as roads and railway tracks - and existing buildings has been exploited at a growing rate in city centres. Because the use of space is being intensified near and above locations with potentially dangerous activities (e.g. transport routes of hazardous materials), any accident may have serious consequences. Focussing on the local project scale, it can be stated that projects using land in multiple ways (realizing buildings above infrastructure) are generally complex. The safety considerations in multiple land-use projects should not be underestimated. Usually, a large number of people and several multiple risk interactions are involved. Due to the complexity and interrelationships of such a project, a small accident, like a fire in the building or on the covered infrastructure, can easily lead to a major disaster. In The Netherlands, some of these buildings are even realized above infrastructure with transport of hazardous materials where LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) is transported (see Figure 1). An accident with a LPG-tank may result in a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion), causing injuries and large structural damage to the spanning building and the vicinity. Fortunately, such disasters hardly occurred in such circumstances. However, one should be aware of that such accidents may occur and potential consequences should be minimised. Generally, one may expect that realizing buildings above infrastructure along with the transport of hazardous materials will both increase in the future. However to quantify the consequences and risks, there is little background literature that addresses this type of problem, i.e. structural control of explosion effects on a building spanning an underpass at which the explosion occurs. Suddle [1] assessed risks quantitatively in order to determine physical safety in multiple use of space projects, including the analysis of structural safety measures to buildings above the infrastructure.
Van den Berg et al. [2] derived guidelines to assess the blast loading and response of a tunnel structure due to a gas explosion. The blast load is given as a function of the length of the gas cloud and the distance from the point of ignition. Recently, Van den Berg et al. [3] developed also a method to quantify the blast load from BLEVE accidents. Information on these methods is given in Section 2. Neither Suddle [1] nor Van den Berg et al. [2] provide specific analyses for structural control of explosion effects of buildings above infrastructure with transport of LPG. This has been the starting point of the research by Van Diermen [4]. Van Diermen [4] analysed some possibilities for the building structure above the infrastructure with the transport of LPG. His work has been extended and updated in the current study.

![Figure 1: An impression of the motorway A10 West, Bos en Lommer Office buildings with transport of hazardous materials (LPG).](image)

This paper gives an introduction analysis of possibilities of how to deal with structural control of explosion effects when realizing buildings spanning roads with transport of hazardous materials. In this regard, some types of the main bearing structure of the building above the infrastructure were inventoried, the explosion effect blast was modelled and the dynamic response of the structural elements and the main bearing structure of the building were analyzed using engineering techniques. Recommendations to limit and control the damage are given.

2. EXPLOSION HAZARDS CAUSED BY LPG TRANSPORT

2.1. Introduction of main hazards due to accident with hazardous materials

The hazard scenarios that may occur on the infrastructure with transport of hazardous materials are collisions, fires, explosions, and leaks of toxic substances (consecutively decreasing in probability of occurrence and increasing in consequences; see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely high</td>
<td>Local traffic accidents and small fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Fires on the infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Explosions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Release of toxic gasses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Frequency and consequences of hazard scenarios in multiple land-use projects with covered infrastructure [5]
These accidents can also be the starting points of others. A fire for instance can cause an explosion and vice versa. The release of toxic gasses hardly initiates other events. In this paper we constrain ourselves to the explosion hazard caused by the transport of LPG. Unfortunately quantitative risk analyses are not possible yet for the confined tunnel conditions because probability data on explosion and accidents in tunnels are not available.

2.2. Possible explosion scenarios originating from LPG transport

LPG is a highly flammable liquefied gas mixture that is transported by road in 50 m³ tankers. The boiling temperature of LPG under ambient pressure is 231 K. LPG is a highly flammable liquefied gas mixture that is transported by road in 50 m³ tankers. The boiling temperature of LPG under ambient pressure is 231 K. To keep LPG liquid under ambient temperatures it is stored and transported under pressure, i.e. the vapour pressure of the liquid at ambient temperatures. The vapour pressure is highly dependent on the LPG temperature. It rises from 730 kPa at 288 K up to 1000 kPa at 300 K and up to 1800 kPa at 326 K. In today's heavy traffic, an LPG tanker may well get involved in a crash by which it may get leak. When the subsequent LPG spill is not immediately ignited, it will develop a flammable vapour cloud downwind. Such a flammable vapour cloud may - dependent on the leak size and atmospheric conditions - extend up to a substantial distance from the leak. If an LPG tanker crashes in the vicinity of the building, the flammable cloud may fill the entire space underneath the building. Ignition of the flammable cloud will result in a flash fire without pressure effects as long as it develops in the open. The flash fire will however, consume the entire flammable part of the cloud and may meet appropriate boundary conditions to develop a gas explosion in the partially confined space underneath the building.

Another conceivable scenario is that a tanker develops a leak of limited size, which is immediately ignited on the impact. The tanker gets engulfed in a fire. Together with the liquid temperature the internal tank pressure starts rising. At the same time the tank wall looses strength, in particular at locations above the liquid level where the heat transfer from tank wall to tank contents is relatively poor. This may finally lead to a catastrophic failure of the tank that, in particular when the liquid in the tank has been heated up to a temperature that allows an explosive evaporation process, may produce a substantial blast effect. In such an event a large portion of the liquid LPG is quickly converted into vapour, which takes approximately 250 times the volume of the original liquid. It may be true that the probability that such a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) takes place just underneath the building is very low but the power of such a massive explosive evaporation process may well endanger the building's structural integrity.

2.3. Modelling of a gas explosion in a tunnel

The pressure loading of a tunnel structure due to a gas explosion has been numerically approximated by the one-dimensional gas dynamics of a column of perfect gas. The gas dynamics is driven by an energy source, a flame whose velocity development is prescribed according to experimental data [2]. The length of the partially confined space underneath the building is 30 m long, which is equal to no more than 6 times the vertical "tunnel height". Application of the one-dimensional numerical model, provided with the proper input for flame speed development, shows that a gas explosion in a tunnel tube of that length containing a traffic jam of standing vehicles will develop an overpressure underneath the building that will not affect the structure.

2.4 Modelling of a BLEVE

An explosive evaporation process is accompanied by the development of a large volume that violently pushes the surrounding atmosphere aside. For the time being, a safe and conservative approach in the modelling of blast is appropriate. Such an approach consists in the simple assumptions that the vessel instantaneously disintegrates and that intrinsically the evaporation of superheated liquid could occur infinitely fast. Then, the evaporation rate is fully determined by the gas dynamics (inertia) of the developing mass of vapour in interaction with the surrounding mass of air.
The evaporation rate is now fully determined by the rate at which the developing vapour can expand by pushing the surrounding air aside. This safe and conservative assumption of expansion-controlled evaporation constitutes the starting point for the computation of the gas dynamics induced by the evaporation process (3). This concept can be framed in a numerical mesh of any geometry. The gas dynamics has been computed by a time stepwise integration of the Euler equations that are the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy for inviscid compressible flow (5).

3. THE BEARING STRUCTURE FOR BUILDING ABOVE INFRASTRUCTURE

The type of main bearing systems for buildings that cover highways have been inventoried and categorized. In the categorization the bearing structure is considered as an element of the structural safety measures to control explosion effects. The results are summarized in this section. For the current study the span of the structure is defined based on a two times two-lane-road, which resulted in a chosen reference span of 36 meter. Four types of span-structures are considered. In combination with the position of the span-structure in the building, ten types of structural design are distinguished; see Table 2 and Table 3. The structures are made of concrete and or steel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Span structure</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column - beam</td>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>Type I A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework beam</td>
<td>Type II A</td>
<td>Type II B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bow structure</td>
<td>Type III A</td>
<td>Type III B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay structure</td>
<td>Type IV A</td>
<td>Type IV B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Schemes of span structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
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<td>II</td>
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<td>IV</td>
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Comments to the bearing systems:
In this study the function of the bearing systems is to transfer the load of all floors to the towers beside the road.
Type II: The height of the beam-structure is set arbitrarily to the height of one level;
Type III: The structure consists of a pressure bow and tension rod.
Type IV: The tie rods are only designed to carry tensile forces. Consequently, the ties are not suited to resist the load of an explosion under the structure.

4. CASE STUDY

Structure type II has been selected to study the explosion effects and the structural response quantitatively to illustrate the phenomena and failure mechanisms that have to be covered. The selected building is depicted in Figure 4 and 5. The properties of the structural elements are given in [4]. This section on the case study is structured as follows. First the blast load of a representative gas explosion and a BLEVE are given. Next the effect on the building and the structural elements will be described qualitatively, supported with quantitative response data.

4.1. Loading of the building

BLEVE
To compute the loading of the building by a BLEVE of LPG of 326 K, a tank of $\varnothing 2.5 \times 10$ m$^2$ was positioned in the centre of the space underneath the building. This location enables to limit the size of the numerical mesh by two planes of symmetry (figure 2). The building and the LPG vapour source have been configured in a mesh of $120 \times 200 \times 150$ cells of $0.2 \times 0.2 \times 0.2$ m$^3$. Overpressure and impulse-time developments have been calculated at various target points at the ceiling in both lengthwise and lateral direction of the structure as well as at the facade.

The pressure-time records show a range of load levels (100 – 1700 kPa) and load profiles due to the reflections and rarefaction of the BLEVE blast wave. To simplify the problem and estimate the effect on the building quantitatively, we only consider the first part i.e. the expanding BLEVE blast wave. The load is schematized to triangular pulses and a positive phase duration based on the calculated impulse values. The blast load on the floor level will definitely result in structural damage, while window breakage will occur at the facade and the elevator core at ground level will be damaged.

Figure 2: The geometric model of the building in two vertical cross-sections (X-X), (Y-Y) and the horizontal section at level A with target points.
4.2. Qualitative description of structure response

The blast load as predicted in the previous section ranges from overwhelming the structural strength (position 1) to window pane failure (double glass, strength in the order of 10 kPa). To illustrate the analysis procedure, building types 2a and 2c (see Table 3) are selected. The bearing system of the building consists of the primary and the secondary system as depicted in Figure 7. The secondary system consists of (i) columns, (ii) beams and (iii) floor panels. The six levels have a system height of 3.5 m, while the column grid is 3.5 x 10 meters. The primary bearing system consists of 4 beams at an intermediate distance of 10 meters. The elements, i.e. floor panels, beams, columns and primary beam structure were designed by Van Diermen [4] using Dutch guidelines, static floor load of 6 kN/m² and floor weight of 3 kN/m².
The upwardly directed blast will load the structure and can cause damage after the vertically directed gravity loads are compensated and exceeded. The effect of primary fragments and also thermal damage due to fire are not considered in the current study. The focus is on blast damage. The loading and response sequence due to blast loading is as follows (e.g. building type II C):

- The panels of the lower floor (level A, see Figure 2) are loaded by the blast (100 – 1700 kPa) and transfer the load to the supporting beams. When the panels fail during the loading phase of the explosion, only a part of the loading is transferred to the beams. Furthermore, the blast will penetrate the building and load the second floor (level B) and the internal walls. The load and response and failure sequence has to be analysed as a function in time.
- The beams are supported by the columns. Therefore, the load transfer sequence from panel to beam, to column to principle bearing system has to be determined.
- The location of the main span structure governs the initial element loading conditions during service life time and consequently the effect of the accidental explosion load.

4.3 Summary quantitative results on damage analysis

All steps mentioned in section 4.2 were analyzed quantitatively. It is evident that due to the extremely high blast load parts of the building will fail. From the chain of load transfer it emerges that the load on the last element, the primary bearing structure, will increase with increasing strength of the previous links, i.e. the columns, supporting beams and floor panels. To prevent building collapse, or partial failure, one of the preceding links has to be sacrificed. The damage to the building can be controlled by the strength and failure time of the elements in the load transfer chain.

The reference building was only designed for static loading (floors: design load 6 kPa; weight load 3 kPa). The blast loading on the panels at level A, leads to shear or bending failure. Because of the short rise time and high amplitude of the load, the dynamic resistance of the panels is exceeded at a very early stage. The load transfer to the supports is limited and the load impulse is transferred to kinetic energy of the panels. The panels are launched into the first building level and the remaining blast load can partly enter the first level also. The tables in Figure 8 give the load distribution on the floors at level A and B, the colours indicate the shear or bending failure resp. Bending failure occurs at a later stage of the response and consequently will result in lower blast pressures on the next floor level. The threshold for bending failure of the floor panels is about 150 kPa.

![Figure 5: Primary and secondary bearing system](image)

![Figure 6: Load distribution and failure mode of floor panels at level A (left) and level B (right). Location tank at target points 1-6. The target points correspond with figure 4. The peak load is given in kPa; red and blue indicate shear and bending failure resp.](image)
For the building, designed for static loading conditions, the BLEVE accident will lead to complete failure of floor level A and a considerable part of level B. The windows at all levels will fail and will be blown into the building. The additional dynamic loading on the secondary and primary bearing system is very limited and the system will definitely survive. Evidently, the consequences of such a BLEVE accident are not acceptable from safety point of view. Three obvious countermeasures are (i) design the windows for 15 kPa, (ii) the lower level should not be used for offices but storage and supporting facilities with a low population density and (iii) a balanced design of the system at level A so that failure occurs at a later stage and level B does not fail and the dynamic resistance capacity of the bearing system (level A) is used.

5. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The reported study shows that controlling explosion effects in multiple use of space projects is important and complicated. The explosion blast loads and the dynamic response up to failure of the elements and the overall building system have to be modelled to classify the risks quantitatively. The reported study shows that the potential consequences of an accident with LPG can be quantified using relatively simple models that were developed. The presented models and approach can be used to estimate the potential consequences of an LPG-accident as an input for risk analysis and identify countermeasures and subsequently to integrate these measures into both structural and building design. For the considered building the consequences of the accident and recommended countermeasures are:

- (i) no damage to the primary and secondary bearing system, (ii) first floor completely fails (iii) secondary floor partly fails, (iii) windows breakage at all levels, (iv) human risks too high at all building levels;
- (i) safety integrated design engineering (structural and functional) (ii) design the windows for blast loading, (iii) the lower level should not be used for offices but storage and supporting facilities and (iv) a balanced design for the floor system at the first level, so that damage is limited to the first level and the dynamic resistance capacity of the bearing system is used.

References